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Plagiarism is Not a Crime
Brian L. Frye*
ABSTRACT
Copyright infringement and plagiarism are related but distinct
concepts. Copyright prohibits certain uses of original works of au-
thorship without permission. Plagiarism norms prohibit copying
certain expressions, facts, and ideas without attribution. The pre-
vailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which holds that
copyright is justified because it is economically efficient. This article
considers whether academic plagiarism norms are economically ef-
ficient. It concludes that academic plagiarism norms prohibiting
non-copyright infringing plagiarism are not efficient and should be
ignored.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"If we steal thoughts from the moderns, it will be cried down as
plagiarism; if, from the ancients, it will be cried up as erudi-
tion."
"I am reminded of the man who was asked what plagiarism
was. He said: 'It is plagiarism when you take something out of
a book and use it as your own. If you take it out of several
books then it is research.'2
"As Wilson Mizner says, 'When you take stuff from one writer
it's plagiarism, but when you take from many writers it's called
research.'3
"On the title page of most of the books on Art should be printed,
'If you steal from one person it's plagiarism: if you steal from
three persons it's research.'4
"The moral is, in literature, not to steal from one author, but to
learn from many. Plagiarism is not only a crime, but a mark
of stupidity, like robbing a country bank."5
"Asa G. Baker quotes a librarian's distinction between plagia-
rism and research: 'If you wrote a paper and quoted without
1. CHARLES CALEB COLTON, LACON: OR, IVIANY THINGS IN FEW WORDS: ADDRESSED To
THOSE WHO THINK 229 (1820).
2. Ralph Foss, Cooperation Between Special Libraries and Publishers, in SPECIAL
LIBRARIES 281 (1932).
3. FRANK CASE, TALES OF A WAYWARD INN 248 (1938).
4. Joseph Cummings Chase, Do You Call THAT Art?, THE COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1938,
at 26.
5. WALTER S. CAMPBELL, PROFESSIONAL WRITING 88-89 (1946).
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credit from a single book, it would be plagiarism; but if you
quoted from three or four, it would be research."'6
"'If you get information from one source,' said Leslie Henson in
his recent London show, 'it's called plagiarism; if you get it from
two or more sources, it's called research."'7
"Bob Oliver suggests a simple rule-of-thumb for would-be
movie scenarists. 'Just remember,' says he, 'if you steal from
one man, it's plagiarism. If you steal from several, it's re-
search.'"8
"If you steal from one author, it's plagiarism; if you steal from
many, it's research."9
"Remember why the good Lord made your eyes,
So don't shade your eyes,
But plagiarize, plagiarize, plagiarize -
Only be sure always to call it please 'research'."10
"To steal ideas from one person is plagiarism. To steal from
many people is research.""
In the 1980s California of my youth, a popular bumper sticker
proclaimed: "Skateboarding is Not a Crime." It was ubiquitous, ap-
pearing on bathroom walls, storefront windows, park benches, and
occasionally even bumpers. While the origin of the slogan is un-
clear, it became popular when Santa Cruz Skateboards and
TransWorld SKATEboarding magazine passed out hundreds of
thousands of bumper stickers, in response to a wave of municipal
regulations prohibiting skateboarding. 12
6. QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/09/20/plagiarism/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 7, 2016).
7. Henry King, New Problems in Advertising and Steps Towards Their Solution, in
CANADIAN MARKETING PROBLEMS: TEN ESSAYS 80 (H.R. Kemp ed., 1939).
8. Jimmie Fidler, Jimmie Fidler in Hollywood, March 17, 1941, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17,
2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/thedailymirror/2011/03/jimmie-fidler-in-hollywood-
march-17-1941.html.
9.Alva Johnston, Legend of a Sport-I, NEWYORKER, Oct. 10, 1942, at 21 (attributed to Wilson
Mizner).
10. TOM LEHRER, LOBACHEVSKY (Lehrer Records 1953).
11. EMERY A. WILSON ET AL., PEARLS: FOR LEADERS IN ACADEMIC MEDICINE 28 (2008)
(attributed to Steven Wright).
12. See, e.g., Barbara Metzler, Cities Fed Up, 'Making Criminals' Out of Skateboarders,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-20/news/mn-
575_1_transworld-skateboarding ("All the bad press prompted Santa Cruz Skateboards,
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The slogan resonated with skateboarders because it expressed
two related but distinct ideas. It not only observed that skateboard-
ing was a prima facie lawful activity, but also implied that regula-
tions prohibiting skateboarding were illegitimate because they
merely reflected and reinforced negative social meanings associated
with skateboarding.13 The literal observation that skateboarding
was not generally prohibited reinforced the implicit assertion that
skateboarding should not be prohibited.
The sociologist Howard Becker famously argued "social groups
create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes
deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and la-
beling them as outsiders."14 As a consequence, deviance is a rela-
tional concept, defined only in relation to the rules created and en-
forced by various social groups: '"[O]utsiders,' from the point of view
of the person who is labeled deviant, may be the people who make
the rules he had been found guilty of breaking."1 5
For example, Becker observed that in the 1960s, mainstream so-
ciety viewed marijuana users as "outsiders" because marijuana use
was prohibited, but marijuana users viewed non-marijuana users
as "outsiders" because they observed prohibitions on martjuana
use.16 Likewise, in the 1980s, mainstream society viewed skate-
boarders as "outsiders" because skateboarding was prohibited, but
skateboarders viewed non- skateboarders as "outsiders" because
they observed prohibitions on skateboarding. In both cases, main-
stream society defined an activity as "deviant" by prohibiting it,
thereby creating a group of "outsiders," and the "outsiders" ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the prohibition by arguing that it was not
justified.
among the largest manufacturers of skateboarding equipment, and Transworld Skateboard-
ing magazine to give out hundreds of thousands of bumper stickers with the message:'Skate-
boarding Is Not a Crime."').
13. Cf. William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 381 n.264 (2013)
("This understanding of the social meaning of crime perhaps explains why some people assert
that activities that are not crimes in fact are not crimes."). Ironically, while skateboarding
is not a crime, saying so might be. In 1998, the USPTO registered three trademarks for the
phrase "SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A CRIME." See SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A CRIME,
Registration No. 2134679 ("75286938 (clothing, namely, T-shirts, sweatshirts, [sweatpants,
jackets,] hats, [and swimwear]")); SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A CRIME, Registration No.
2134680 ("75286939 (skateboards and skateboard decks")); SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A
CRIME, Registration No. 2137534 ("75286940 (decalcomanias, decals, [paper flags] and pa-
per banners")).
14. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 9 (1963)
(emphasis omitted).
15. Id. at 15.
16. See generally id. at 41-78.
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But Becker's dialectical theory of deviance is not limited to formal
legal rules. Social groups routinely define certain activities as "de-
viant" by creating and enforcing social norms that prohibit those
activities, and labeling people who engage in those activities as
"outsiders."17 Legal scholars have observed that stand-up comedi-
ans prohibit "joke-stealing," roller derby skaters prohibit "pseudo-
nym-stealing," and tattoo artists prohibit "tattoo-stealing."18 These
social norms effectively create extra-legal property rights in jokes,
pseudonyms, and tattoos.
Likewise, many social groups define "plagiarism" as "deviant" by
creating and enforcing social norms that prohibit copying certain
expressions, facts, and ideas without attribution.19 These plagia-
rism norms effectively create extra-legal "attribution rights" in ex-
pressions, facts, and ideas. Different social groups have adopted
different plagiarism norms. Academic plagiarism norms create
some of the most expansive "attribution rights," by prohibiting the
use of any expression, fact, or idea without attribution.
While copyright and plagiarism norms often overlap, they are an-
alytically distinct and protect substantively different rights. Copy-
right prohibits certain uses of original works of authorship without
permission, irrespective of attribution; plagiarism norms prohibit
copying certain expressions, facts, and ideas without attribution,
irrespective of copyright protection. Notably, copyright does not
and cannot protect facts or ideas, or require their attribution, but
plagiarism norms typically require the attribution of both facts and
ideas. As a result, copying with attribution may be copyright in-
fringement, but cannot be plagiarism, and copying without attribu-
tion is plagiarism, but may not be copyright infringement.
The prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which
holds that copyright is justified because it solves market failures in
works of authorship caused by free riding by giving marginal au-
thors an incentive to invest in the creation of works of authorship.20
In other words, copyright is justified because it increases net social
welfare: the social cost of providing copyright protection is exceeded
17. Id. at 1-4.
18. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore):
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand- Up Comedy,
94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1787-88 (2008); David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property
Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012); Aaron Per-
zanowski, Tattoos and IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 541-60 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 175 (2002).
20. See generally RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS (2013).
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by the social benefit of additional works of authorship. By implica-
tion, copyright is justified when it increases net social welfare, and
not justified when it reduces net social welfare.
Of course, just as legal rules may or may not be justified, social
norms also may or may not be justified. Scholars have previously
questioned the legitimacy of the informal property rights created by
social norms by asking whether they are justified on welfarist
grounds.21 Plagiarism norms effectively create an extra-legal form
of copyright protection by giving authors a de facto "attribution
right" in certain expressions, facts, and ideas. Under the economic
theory of copyright, plagiarism norms are justified if they increase
social welfare, and are not justified if they decrease social welfare.
This article argues that academic plagiarism norms that prohibit
non-copyright infringing copying are not justified under the eco-
nomic theory of copyright because they require attribution even
when it reduces public welfare. When applied to scholars, they re-
duce public welfare by requiring inefficient attribution and creating
inefficient incentives. When applied to students, they reduce public
welfare by prohibiting efficient pedagogical techniques, including
"patch writing," or the use of imitation as a method of developing
writing skills.22
II. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution empowers
Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writ-
ings . . . ."23 The Copyright Act uses that power to give authors
certain exclusive rights to use the original elements of their works
of authorship for a limited period of time, subject to certain excep-
tions, including "fair use."24
The Intellectual Property Clause also limits the potential scope
of copyright protection.25 It provides that Congress can only afford
21. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Who's in the Club?: A Response to Oliar and Sprig-
man, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Does Equity Pass the Laugh Test?: A
Response to Oliar and Sprigman, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 9 (2009); Jennifer E. Rothman,
Custom, Comedy, and the Value of Dissent, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 19 (2009). But see Dotan
Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, From Corn to Norms: How IP Entitlements Affect What
Stand-up Comedians Create, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 57 (2009). See also Stephen Clowney,
Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59.
22. See generally REBECCA MOORE HOWARD, STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS:
PLAGIARISTS, AUTHORS, COLLABORATORS (1999).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122 (2012 & Supp. 2014).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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copyright protection for "limited times," a limitation observed
largely in the breach.26 But it also provides that copyright can only
protect the "original elements" of a work of authorship, which must
be "independently created by the author" and reflect "at least some
minimal degree of creativity."2 7 The "independent creation" re-
quirement provides that an element of a work is original only if it
is not a copy of something that already exists, so copyright cannot
protect an element of a work that is copied from a previously exist-
ing work.2 8 Likewise, copyright cannot protect facts, because they
are not created, but discovered: "The first person to find and report
a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely dis-
covered its existence."29 While the "creativity" requirement pro-
vides that an element of a work is original only if it reflects a "mod-
icum of creativity," it is effectively meaningless, because the Su-
preme Court has not defined "creativity" or explained how to meas-
ure it. 30
In addition, copyright does not and cannot protect ideas. The
Copyright Act provides: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, re-
gardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." 3 1 As the Supreme Court has observed,
the "idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance be-
tween the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting
26. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (reviewing Congress's decision to
extend the copyright term under the rational basis test); see also Brian L. Frye, Eldred & the
New Rationality, 104 KY. L.J. ONLINE 1 n.44 (July 17, 2015), http://www.kentuckylawjour-
nal.org/index.php/2015/07/17/eldred-new-rationality/#more-177 (asking whether the Su-
preme Court should revisit Eldred and related cases given apparent changes in the rational
basis test).
27. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
28. Id. As Justice Holmes famously explained, "Others are free to copy the original. They
are not free to copy the copy." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249
(1903) (citing Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828). In theory, copyright can
protect an element of a work that is identical to an element of a pre-existing work, if it was
not copied from the pre-existing work. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). But in practice, most courts would assume "unconscious copying."
See, for example, Bright Thines Music Corporation u. Harrisongs Music, Limited:
Did Harrison deliberately use the music of He's So Fine? I do not believe he did so
deliberately. Nevertheless, it is clear that My Sweet Lord is the very same song as
He's So Fine with different words, and Harrison had access to He's So Fine. This is,
under the law, infringement of copyright, and is no less so even though subconsciously
accomplished.
420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
29. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 347
30. Id. at 362.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
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free communication of facts while still protecting an author's ex-
pression."'32
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Copyright infringement is a tort, and intentional copyright in-
fringement for commercial purposes is a crime.33 If an original ele-
ment of a copyrighted work is used without permission, the copy-
right owner may file an infringement action.34 In order to make out
a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a copyright owner
must show that the defendant actually copied one or more original
elements of the copyrighted work, and that copying the original el-
ements made the works substantially similar.35
Copyright may also protect certain moral rights. For example,
the Berne Convention requires its signatories to grant authors a
right of attribution and a right of integrity.36 The right of attribu-
tion gives authors the right to require attribution to their works of
authorship, while the right of integrity gives authors the right to
prevent the alteration or destruction of their works of authorship.37
In conjunction, the rights of attribution and integrity may also pro-
vide authors with the right to disclaim authorship of a work, under
certain circumstances.
In general, United States copyright law does not protect moral
rights. While the Copyright Act does provide limited rights of at-
tribution and integrity to the authors of certain works of visual art,
these are the exception that proves the rule.3 8 The Copyright Act
does not provide a general attribution right, and at least in theory,
attribution is largely irrelevant to copyright infringement.39 Non-
32. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
33. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-513 (2012 & Supp. 2014).
34. Id.
35. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 361 ("To establish infringement, two elements must
be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
work that are original.").
36. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis.,
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 222.
37. Id.
38. See The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA"), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
39. Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribution, and Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 2 (2005) ("In Dastar, Fox attempted to impose legal liability on Dastar for non-attrib-
ution. It attempted to convert plagiarism, which violates the moral standards of many pro-
fessions and communities, into a legal violation. The Supreme Court rejected this effort em-
phatically.") (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 27, 38
(2003)).
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attribution is not an element of an infringement action, and attrib-
ution is not a defense to infringement action.40
IV. PLAGIARISM
Plagiarism is not a legal wrong. There is no cause of action for
plagiarism. It is neither a tort, nor a crime. Plagiarism is a social
wrong, defined and enforced extra-legally by different social groups
in different ways.
But plagiarism is punished no less severely than copyright in-
fringement. Indeed, the social sanctions associated with plagiarism
are arguably even more severe than the legal sanctions associated
with copyright infringement, because they preclude expiation.
"Plagiarism is considered by most writers, teachers, journalists,
scholars, and even members of the general public to be the capital
intellectual crime."4 1 Tortfeasors must pay damages, and criminals
must endure punishment, but plagiarism is forever: "The label is
the academic equivalent of the mark of Cain."42 A student "con-
victed" of plagiarism may be expelled, and a scholar may be fired.
At least in theory, plagiarists may have "second acts" in their lives,
but not in their academic careers.43
Plagiarism is typically defined as copying without attribution.
For example, Black's Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as, "The
deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original
ideas or creative expression as one's own.1"44 Chafee distinguished
copyright infringement and plagiarism by observing, "In piracy, un-
licensed persons still give the author credit; in plagiarism they take
the credit themselves."4 5
In other words, the essence of plagiarism is misattribution, and
plagiarism norms typically prohibit copying certain expressions
and ideas without attribution. And yet, there is no uniform defini-
tion of plagiarism. As St. Onge observed, "Plagiarism shares a cu-
rious semantic feature with the term pornography. Even though
we cannot agree on specifics, '[w]e know it when we see it.'46
The meaning of the term "plagiarism" is indeterminate in part
because it depends on social context. Different social groups define
40. Id.
41. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 107 (2007).
42. K. R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 61 (1988).
43. Cf. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE LAST TYCOON (1941).
44. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (8th ed. 2004).
45. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
513 (1945).
46. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 51.
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plagiarism differently by adopting various plagiarism norms.47 In
practice, journalistic plagiarism norms typically require the attrib-
ution of copied expressions, but do not require the attribution of
copied facts and ideas.4 8 However, many plagiarism norms do not
require the attribution of certain expressions. For example, most
social groups do not require the attribution of jokes and anecdotes.4 9
The definition of the term "plagiarism" is also indeterminate be-
cause plagiarism norms typically fail to adequately define plagia-
rism. Plagiarism norms often fail to specify exactly what they pro-
tect, how they protect it, and when they apply. As a consequence,
it can be difficult to determine whether particular uses of works of
authorship require attribution. This difficulty encourages a "cul-
ture of attribution," or a social norm of attributing all copied expres-
sions, facts, and ideas, whether or not attribution is helpful or jus-
tified. The stronger the plagiarism norms adopted by a social group,
the greater the incentive to attribute in all cases to avoid potential
violations.
A. Academic Plagiarism Norms
In the interest of brevity and clarity, this article's analysis will
focus on academic plagiarism norms because they are both expan-
sive and paradigmatic. Academic plagiarism norms typically re-
quire the attribution of expressions, facts, and ideas. The Modern
Language Association ("MLA") has promulgated the following
widely accepted definition of academic plagiarism: "Plagiarism is
the use of another person's ideas or expressions in your writing
without acknowledging the source."5 0
47. See, e.g., Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Plagiarism: Legal and Ethical Implications for
the University, 37 J.C. & U.L. 1, 15-18 (2010) ("A review of the literature suggests that no
universal understanding exists with respect to plagiarism; rather, it is a term that encom-
passes a variety of permutations that extend beyond the mere appropriation of another's
specific language.").
48. Compare NYU JOURNALISM HANDBOOK FOR STUDENTS, available at http://journal-
ism.nyu.edulwp-content/uploads/document-nyu-journalism-handbook-for-students.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2016) (defining plagiarism as the unattributed copying of expressions, ideas,
or facts) with Trudy Lieberman, Plagiarize, Plagiarize, Plagiarize . . . only be sure to call it
research, 34 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 21 (1995) (observing that in practice journalistic pla-
giarism norms typically only require the attribution of expressions).
49. But see Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 18, at 1787.
50. WALTER S. ACHTERT & JOSEPH GIBALDI, THE MLA STYLE MANUAL 4 (1985). The MLA
also provides that:
The most blatant form of plagiarism is reproducing someone else's sentences, more or
less verbatim, and presenting them as your own. Other forms include repeating an-
other's particularly apt phrase without appropriate acknowledgement, paraphrasing
someone else's argument as your own, introducing another's line of thinking as your
own development of an idea, and failing to cite the source for a borrowed thesis or
approach.
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The MLA plagiarism policy explicitly prohibits the unattributed
copying of expressions and ideas, defining both terms quite broadly.
Specifically, it prohibits unattributed copying of "expressions," in-
cluding "sentences" and "apt phrases."5 1 By contrast, copyright law
typically does not protect individual sentences, and cannot protect
short phrases.52 In addition, the MLA policy prohibits the unat-
tributed copying of "ideas," including an "argument," line of think-
ing," or "thesis."53 By contrast, copyright law does not and cannot
protect "ideas," which would include all of these examples.54
In addition, the MLA definition of plagiarism is remarkably
vague. Academic plagiarism norms effectively create an "attribu-
tion right" in certain expressions and ideas, but it is unclear when
such a right exists. When do "sentences" and "apt phrases" belong
to someone? What if a sentence is conventional, factual, trivial, or
banal? When is a phrase "apt"? Are inapt phrases unprotected?
Who decides whether a sentence or phrase is entitled to protection?
When does an "argument," "line of thinking," or "thesis" belong to
someone? What if it is not unique to the copied work?
Educational institutions typically adopt plagiarism policies gov-
erning student work, which provide various definitions of plagia-
rism. For example, the University of Kentucky's plagiarism policy
provides:
All academic work, written or otherwise, submitted by stu-
dents to their instructors or other academic supervisors, is ex-
pected to be the result of their own thought, research, or self-
expression. In cases where students feel unsure about a ques-
tion of plagiarism involving their work, they are obliged to con-
sult their instructors on the matter before submission.
When students submit work purporting to be their own, but
which in any way borrows ideas, organization, wording or any-
thing else from another source without appropriate acknowl-
edgment of the fact, the students are guilty of plagiarism.
Id.
51. Id.
52. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR 34, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT PHRASES, (2015), available at http://copy-
right.gov/circs/circ34.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
53. See ACHTERT & GIBALDI, supra note 50, at 4.
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work.").
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Plagiarism includes reproducing someone else's work, whether
it be published article, chapter of a book, a paper from a friend
or some file, or whatever. Plagiarism also includes the practice
of employing or allowing another person to alter or revise the
work which a student submits as his/her own, whoever that
other person may be. Students may discuss assignments
among themselves or with an instructor or tutor, but when the
actual work is done, it must be done by the student, and the
student alone.
When a student's assignment involves research in outside
sources or information, the student must carefully
acknowledge exactly what, where and how he/she has em-
ployed them. If the words of someone else are used, the student
must put quotation marks around the passage in question and
add an appropriate indication of its origin. Making simple
changes while leaving the organization, content and phraseol-
ogy intact is plagiaristic. However, nothing in these Rules
shall apply to those ideas which are so generally and freely cir-
culated as to be a part of the public domain.55
The vagueness and overbreadth of this plagiarism policy is obvi-
ous and impressive, and worth reviewing line by line:
* "When students submit work purporting to be their
own, but which in any way borrows ideas, organization,
wording or anything else from another source without
appropriate acknowledgment of the fact, the students
are guilty of plagiarism."5 6 The policy prohibits stu-
dents from copying "anything" without attribution,
which presumably includes expressions, facts, and
ideas, no matter how generic or trivial.
* "Plagiarism includes reproducing someone else's work,
whether it be published article, chapter of a book, a pa-
per from a friend or some file, or whatever."5 7 Presum-
ably, this is a mistake, because it appears to prohibit
copying with attribution, which is typically not consid-
ered plagiarism.
55. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY SENATE RULES, 6.3.1 PLAGIARISM (Feb.
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* "Plagiarism also includes the practice of employing or
allowing another person to alter or revise the work
which a student submits as his/her own, whoever that
other person may be. Students may discuss assign-
ments among themselves or with an instructor or tutor,
but when the actual work is done, it must be done by
the student, and the student alone."5 8 Apparently, stu-
dents may discuss their work with professors and other
students, but may not incorporate any advice they re-
ceive.
* "When a student's assignment involves research in out-
side sources or information, the student must carefully
acknowledge exactly what, where and how he/she has
employed them."59 The policy requires attribution of
any use of "outside sources or information," but does not
define either term, or explain what counts as use.
* "If the words of someone else are used, the student must
put quotation marks around the passage in question
and add an appropriate indication of its origin."60 While
the policy states the "words of someone else," it does not
explain when words belong to someone else and when
they do not.
* "Making simple changes while leaving the organization,
content and phraseology intact is plagiaristic." The pol-
icy prohibits copying the "organization, content and
phraseology" of a work, without providing any defini-
tion of those terms or what they might include.61
* "However, nothing in these Rules shall apply to those
ideas which are so generally and freely circulated as to
be a part of the public domain."6 2 The policy does not
require attribution of "those ideas which are so gener-
ally and freely circulated as to be a part of the public
domain," but does not describe how to determine








infelicitous term in this context given that under copy-
right law, all ideas are in the public domain by defini-
tion. Moreover, the policy specifically prohibits unat-
tributed copying of many public domain elements, like
facts, ideas, and organization.
Finally, the policy helpfully advises: "In cases where students feel
unsure about a question of plagiarism involving their work, they
are obliged to consult their instructors on the matter before submis-
sion."63 Hopefully, there are an awful lot of such consultations, be-
cause it is hard to imagine how any student attempting to follow
this policy could possibly be anything but "unsure" about any "ques-
tion of plagiarism." In any case, I am certainly confused.
The vagueness of academic plagiarism norms is troubling be-
cause laws and social norms should not be arbitrary. As St. Onge
observed: "Either there are rules and laws pertaining to the term or
the term itself is a useless, even pernicious, entity."64 Social norms
are, by their very nature, typically less formal and well defined than
laws. However, the academic plagiarism norms governing both
scholars and students were codified long ago. It is rather surprising
that such norms remain inchoate.65
The arbitrariness of plagiarism norms has long provoked criti-
cism and satire. As Voltaire observed: "It is chiefly in poetry that
plagiarism is allowed to pass; and certainly, of all larcenies, it is
that which is least dangerous to society."6 6 Many have noted the
formidable risk of hypocrisy, given that many complainants have
themselves copied without attribution. The notable satirist Am-
brose Bierce defined plagiarism as, "[a] literary coincidence com-
pounded of a discreditable priority and an honorable subsequence,"
and, "[t]o take the thought or style of another writer whom one has
63. Id.
64. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at x.
65. For example, Professor Steven Dutch states:
It is certainly true that colleges and universities are seeing an epidemic of plagiarism,
fueled by easy electronic access to resources, including "research papers." Back in the
days before the Internet, students at least had to put out the effort to type out their
stolen work by hand; now they need merely cut and paste. It is equally true that we
are seeing an epidemic of faulty definitions of plagiarism, including high-profile but
inaccurate and unsupportable claims of plagiarism lodged against prominent authors
and filmmakers. Bad definitions of plagiarism confuse students and simultaneously
trivialize the problem. The examples cited in style manuals are commonly so pedantic
that students might be pardoned if they conclude the whole issue is a matter of aca-
demic nit-picking.
Steven Dutch, Sense and Nonsense About Plagiarism, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-GREEN BAY
(last updated June 2, 2010), https://www.uwgb.eduldutchs/PSEUDOSC/Plagiar
Nonsense.HTM.
66. VOLTAIRE, PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 205 (William F. Fleming trans. 1901).
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never, never read."67 And a popular online dictionary even uses an
unattributed quip to illustrate the use of the term: "It is said that
he plagiarized Thoreau's plagiarism of a line written by Mon-
taigne."68
Regardless, plagiarism norms are at least nominally observed
and enforced, effectively creating an extra-legal attribution right in
works of authorship by using social sanctions to punish the unat-
tributed copying of expressions, facts, and ideas under certain cir-
cumstances. The scope of the attribution right depends on the so-
cial group that creates and enforces the plagiarism norm. In the
case of academic plagiarism norms this right is broad indeed, ex-
tending, at least theoretically, to every expression, fact, or idea in a
work of authorship, no matter how pedestrian.
V. COMPARING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT & PLAGIARISM
Copyright infringement and plagiarism are often mistakenly
used as synonyms. For example, journalists often refer to copyright
infringement actions as "plagiarism" claims, probably because they
are more familiar with plagiarism norms than copyright law.69 But
judges also make this mistake, especially when considering copy-
right infringement actions that make claims on the fringes of copy-
right protection. In one copyright infringement action, Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation,70 Judge Learned Hand ob-
served "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of
his work he did not pirate."71
Copyright infringement and plagiarism do share one essential re-
quirement: copying. Without copying, there is neither copyright in-
fringement, nor plagiarism. Conflating copyright infringement and
plagiarism, Judge Learned Hand famously observed:
Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not
himself pro tanto an 'author'; but if by some magic a man who
had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a
67. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY, TALES, AND MEMOIRS 581 (S.T. Joshi ed.,
2011).
68. Plagiarism Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pla-
giarism (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
69. See, e.g., Lauren Moraski, Led Zeppelin loses first round in "Stairway to Heaven"pla-
giarism lawsuit, CBS NEWS, (Oct. 21, 2014 11:21 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/led-
zeppelin-loses-first-round-in-stairway-to-heaven-plagiarism-lawsuit/.
70. Sheldon, 81 F.2d 49.
71. Id. at 56. See also Mayimba Music, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 12 Civ. 1094 (AKH),
2014 WL 5334698, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014) ("Both songs are also structured around
a long verse, which are not similar. However, plagiarism cannot be excused by showing that
not everything has been pirated.") (citing Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 56).
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Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it,
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course
copy Keats's.72
However, while copyright infringement and plagiarism often
overlap, they are not synonymous. Copyright infringement may not
be plagiarism, and plagiarism may not be copyright infringement.
Reproducing-with attribution-a protected element of a copy-
righted work can be an infringing use, but cannot be plagiarism. By
contrast, reproducing a public domain work and attributing it to
oneself cannot be a copyright infringement, but is a textbook exam-
ple of plagiarism.73 As David Nimmer observed:
Copyright infringement never occurs, for instance, when one
copies another's idea or even a brief phrase of expression from
a work still subject to copyright protection. Furthermore, even
copying the entirety of another's public domain expression-for
example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s The Path of the Law,
published in 1897-is analytically incapable of falling afoul of
copyright law. By contrast, a professor who published under
his own name all or part of The Path of the Law would be guilty
of the most serious academic breach, potentially deserving ter-
mination. Indeed, if he purloined only an uncredited phrase or
even idea, he would find himself culpable for plagiarism under
the definition just quoted. By the same token, a student who
submitted to her professor a paper setting forth verbatim, but
under her own name, paragraphs from The Path of the Law,
would be subject to the full disciplinary weight that the school
could bring to bear.74
In other words, copyright infringement and plagiarism overlap,
but are not co-extensive. Copyright law prohibits certain unauthor-
ized uses of copyrighted works, irrespective of attribution, and pla-
giarism norms prohibit unattributed copying of certain expressions,
facts, and ideas, irrespective of copyright protection. Using an orig-
inal element of a copyrighted work with attribution may be copy-
right infringement, but cannot be plagiarism, and copying a fact or
72. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54 (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249); Gerlach-Barklow Co. v.
Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)).
73. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Disco Azteca Distribs., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1164
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (observing that the Copyright Act does not create a general attribution
right).
74. David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without A
Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 67-68 (2004).
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VI. THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT
A. Economic Theory
The prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which
holds that copyright is justified because it increases economic effi-
ciency by solving market failures in works of authorship caused by
free riding.7 5 Classical economics predicts that free riding will
cause market failures in non-rivalrous or "public" goods because ra-
tional economic actors will underinvest in the production of public
goods if they cannot recover the fixed and opportunity costs of pro-
duction. Works of authorship are quintessential public goods be-
cause they are perfectly non-rivalrous; so classical economics pre-
dicts that free riding will cause market failures in works of author-
ship.76
Under the economic theory, copyright solves market failures in
works of authorship by making them partially excludable.7 7 The
exclusive rights provided by copyright enable authors to recover
their fixed and opportunity costs, by giving them certain exclusive
rights to use works of authorship for a certain period of time. As a
result, authors can internalize some of the positive externalities or
"s pillovers" generated by the creation of a work of authorship by
75. A "market failure" is an economic inefficiency in the allocation of a good, and "free
riding" is the ability to consume a good without paying the marginal cost of production.
76. See generally CASS & HYLTON, supra note 20.
77. Id. at 78.
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charging consumers more than the marginal cost of production.7 8
In other words, copyright increases economic efficiency by indirectly
subsidizing authors; thereby providing an incentive for marginal
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship.
The utilitarian theory resembles the economic theory, but holds
that copyright is justified because it increases social welfare, which
includes both economic and non-economic goods.79 Under the utili-
tarian theory, economically inefficient copyright protection is justi-
fied if it causes the production of non-economic goods that increase
net social welfare.8 0
B. 'Moral Rights" Theories
By contrast, "moral rights" theories of copyright rely on deonto-
logical justifications.8 1 The Lockean "labor theory" holds that copy-
right is justified because people have a natural right to own the
fruits of their labor.82 By contrast, the Hegelian and Kantian "per-
sonality theories" hold that copyright is justified because a work of
authorship is an expression of the personality of its author, and peo-
ple are entitled to exercise control over themselves by exercising
control over their expressions.83
C. Assumptions of This Article
This article makes three assumptions. First, it assumes that con-
sequentialism is a true moral theory. In other words, it accepts that
an act or omission is justified if it produces a good outcome, and not
78. See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (2007).
79. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive The-
ories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 229 (2014); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as
Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 Wis. L. REV 141; Jeanne
C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443-44 (2010).
80. See, e.g., Bracha & Syed, supra note 79, at 229; Fromer, supra note 79, at 1443-44.
81. See generally, Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIAL. & ECON. 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000), available
at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/1600book.pdf; William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen Mun-
zer ed., 2001).
82. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-83
(1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-330
(1988).
83. See Menell, supra note 81, at 156-63 (outlining the labor and personhood theories,
among others); see generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(2011) (providing a more detailed account of the Lockean and Kantian theories of intellectual
property).
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justified if it produces a bad outcome.8 4 By extension, it assumes
that the deontological moral theories are not true moral theories.
While the prevailing theories of copyright are the consequential-
ist economic and utilitarian theories, some scholars advocate ver-
sions of the deontological "moral rights" theories.8 5 Scholars disa-
gree about whether the consequentialist and deontological theories
are compatible. Some assume that they are.86 But others disagree.
Notably, some consequentialists have argued that the "moral
rights" theories of copyright are incompatible with consequential-
ism and reduce to question begging.87 And some deontologists have
adopted "moral rights" theories at least in part because they believe
that the current scope and duration of copyright is inconsistent with
consequentialism.8 8
Second, this article assumes that the economic theory of copy-
right is correct and explains the justification for copyright. In any
case, it is strongly implied by the Intellectual Property Clause,
which authorizes Congress to create copyright protection in order
to "promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience."8 9 The Supreme Court has
uniformly held that the Intellectual Property Clause relies on an
economic theory of justification: "The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'90
Third, this article accepts that copyright is currently consistent
with the economic theory. This proposition is considerably more
controversial. Many scholars have argued that the duration of cop-
yright protection is inconsistent with the economic theory because
84. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., 2003).
85. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 83.
86. See generally CASS & HYLTON, supra note 20.
87. See, e.g, Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328
(2015) (arguing that consequentialist and eontological theories are incompatible). But see
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746
(2012) (arguing that the incentives provided by economic and moral rights are complemen-
tary); Brian L. Frye, Machiavellian Intellectual Property, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (arguing that the consequentialist and eontological theories of intellectual property
are incompatible, but can be harmonized by adopting a consequentialist public theory and a
deontological private theory).
88. See generally MERGES, supra note 83.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
90. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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it continues long after most works of authorship have lost all eco-
nomic value.91 Others have argued that the scope of copyright pro-
tection is too broad because it covers many uses of copyrighted
works that do not affect the incentives or legitimate economic inter-
ests of their owners.92 Still others have argued that copyright pro-
tection is broadly unjustified because it does not provide a salient
incentive to many authors.93
In light of these empirical criticisms of the justification of copy-
right protection under the economic theory, we should be chary of
further expanding the scope of intellectual property rights in works
of authorship. In particular, we should consider whether social
norms that effectively create additional extra-legal intellectual
property rights in works of authorship are justified under the eco-
nomic theory, before endorsing their legitimacy.
Essentially, this article assumes that the economic theory of cop-
yright is true, and asks whether plagiarism norms that prohibit
non-copyright infringing plagiarism are justified under the eco-
nomic theory. If you reject the economic theory of copyright, and in
particular if you accept a "moral rights" theory of copyright, you re-
ject the premises of this article, and consequently will not find its
conclusions compelling. But if you accept the economic theory of
copyright, this article argues that you should reject plagiarism
norms that prohibit non-copyright infringing plagiarism.
VII. THEORIES OF PLAGIARISM
Surprisingly, there is no prevailing theory of plagiarism. While
innumerable scholars have studied plagiarism, the overwhelming
majority has focused on its prevention. Passing few have asked
whether and why plagiarism norms are justified. As a consequence,
plagiarism is woefully under-theorized, and the justification for pla-
giarism norms is unclear.
This article surveys the various theories of plagiarism. In the
interest of brevity and clarity, it focuses on academic plagiarism
norms, which are both expansive and paradigmatic. It begins by
identifying the inchoate theory of plagiarism embedded in academic
plagiarism norms. Of necessity, it takes a forensic, or "trouble-case"
91. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242-45 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
92. See generally WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO Fix COPYRIGHT (2012).
93. See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015).
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approach to this inquiry, considering a series of examples and iden-
tifying the rationale for their resolution.94 Next, it considers the
handful of theories of plagiarism advanced by scholars. Finally, it
asks whether any of those theories of plagiarism are consistent with
the economic theory of copyright.
A. Colloquial Theories of Plagiarism
Colloquial theories of plagiarism typically define it as a form of
"literary theft."95 From this definition, it follows inexorably that
plagiarism norms are justified as a method of preventing such
"theft":
The synonyms that usually accompany the term plagiarism are
both many and lurid: larceny, piracy, pilfering, stealing, pur-
loining, robbery, thievery, even kleptomania. The term acts as
an adhesive incendiary that spreads a poisonous mist. There
is almost no end to the inventory of felonious parallels that the
literary and scholarly worlds have fashioned to protect their
interests .96
But we should be wary of such intellectual property metaphors,
as they are prone to lead us astray.9 7 We should "not permit ana-
logical reasoning to allow guilt by metaphor."9 8 What does the pla-
giarist "steal"? What is the nature of the "property" that plagiarism
norms protect? It is not physical property. A plagiarist does not
steal books; or rather, stealing books does not make one a plagiarist:
This lexicon of loaded words is intended to inhibit the timid,
intimidate the brash, and punish the perpetrators. In fact, the
intellectual world has itself purloined the entire vocabulary of
theft to characterize literary stealing, which is the ultimate in
intellectual laziness. It is disconcerting that so little effort has
been made to get behind the surface features of plagiarism.99
Plagiarism is "theft" only in the sense that the plagiarist copies
something from a work of authorship created by someone else. But
a plagiarist's copying may be quite attenuated. A plagiarist need
94. Cf. KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN & EDWARD ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE
WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
95. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 41, at 11; ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 51, 61; THOMAS
1VIALLON, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF PLAGIARISM 99 (1989).
96. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 61.
97. See generally Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735 (2015).
98. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 62.
99. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 61.
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not copy an entire work, or even a single word from a work. Aca-
demic plagiarism norms prohibit copying even ideas.
The essence of plagiarism is copying without attribution. The
plagiarist "steals" an author's attribution right by using some ele-
ment of a work of authorship without attribution. But why is the
attribution right justified, when is an attribution right justified,
and how is an attribution right "stolen"?
Plagiarism norms typically take the justification of the attribu-
tion right for granted. Today, the overwhelming majority of people
simply assume that authors are entitled to an attribution right.
Thomas Mallon's best-selling "history of plagiarism," Stolen Words,
exemplifies this attitude:
I was, through my research, eventually, and much more than I
expected to be, appalled: by the victims I learned of, by the au-
dacity of their predators, by the excuses made for the latter.
The inability of the literary and academic worlds adequately to
define, much less reasonably punish, instances of plagiarism
was something I observed again and again. Our thinking on
the subject, I realized, is primitive, and our fear of dealing with
plagiarism when it's just been discovered-as opposed to recol-
lected from schooldays or literary history-leads us into bun-
gling and injustice.100
So, Mallon is "appalled" by plagiarism and "appalled" that any-
one would question the legitimacy of plagiarism norms.101 Never
mind that his own book documents the emergence of modern pla-
giarism norms in the early 19th century, prior to which imitation
was not merely tolerated, but expected-if not required.102
Many of the anecdotes favored by colloquial accounts of plagia-
rism illustrate the incoherence of academic plagiarism norms. For
example, Mallon rather gleefully recounts an incident in which the
plagiarism policy in the University of Oregon student handbook
was copied verbatim from a Stanford University student hand-
book.103
Initially, the irony of a plagiarized plagiarism policy is delicious.
But on reflection, the objection seems insubstantial, or even absurd.
The purpose of a plagiarism policy is to define plagiarism and ex-
100. 1VIALLON, supra note 95, at xii.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1-40.
103. Id. at 100.
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plain how to avoid it. Plagiarism policies are not intended to pre-
sent original ideas or expressions. In fact, they affirmatively should
not present original ideas or expressions. If the Stanford plagia-
rism policy accurately defined plagiarism and correctly explained
how to avoid it, there was no reason for the University of Oregon to
change it. Indeed, the only good reason for the University of Oregon
to change the Stanford policy would be to improve its clarity or cor-
rect an error. In other words, putative criticisms of the University
of Oregon's supposed plagiarism ultimately expose the incoherence
of the very plagiarism norms it allegedly violated.
By way of analogy, a plagiarism policy is like a statute. When a
legislature adopts a uniform statute or copies a statute enacted in
another jurisdiction, plagiarism is not a coherent objection. The
authorship of a statute is irrelevant to its purpose, so attribution is
pointless and meaningless. Statutes are meant to be copied. In-
deed, people typically object to unnecessary changes or amend-
ments, because they reduce uniformity across jurisdictions.
What explains this reflexive extension of plagiarism norms to cir-
cumstances where they make no sense, even on their own terms?
Perhaps it is a function of their ubiquity, the stigma attached to
their violation, and the taboo against questioning their justifica-
tion.104 Regardless, it is somewhat surprising, given that the attrib-
ution right created by plagiarism norms is a rather novel develop-
ment, and even today is observed largely in the breach. While some
social groups adopt strong plagiarism norms, many adopt none at
all. Presumably, the "decision" whether to adopt plagiarism norms
is driven by game theoretical considerations intrinsic to a social
group: If the members of a social group value attribution, then the
group is likely to adopt internal plagiarism norms.1 05 However, that
does not necessarily mean that the plagiarism norms adopted are
justified under the economic theory.106
At the very end of his book, Mallon does offer a cursory economic
justification of plagiarism norms:
So why don't we give up worrying about an offense that leaves
many of us feeling amused or ambivalent? Because ceasing to
care about plagiarism would not mean that writers had expe-
rienced a rise in wisdom and generosity; it would mean that
104. See generally POSNER, supra note 41; ST. ONGE, supra note 42; IVIALLON, supra note
95.
105. Cf. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 18.
106. Cf. Strandburg, supra note 21; Smith, supra note 21; Rothman, supra note 21; Clow-
ney, supra note 21.
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they had permitted themselves a loss of self-respect. And if ego
stopped mattering, then, very likely, writers would stop writ-
ing-or at least stop writing so frequently and well. Which
means that, finally, plagiarism would be a crime against the
reader.107
David Nimmer has offered a similar, but slightly narrower eco-
nomic justification of academic plagiarism norms:
At base, the different currency of the Academy accounts for the
different regime that should govern it. The laws of the mar-
ketplace are ill served by allowing authors who no longer enjoy
copyright protection to assert ersatz ownership through the ve-
hicle of reverse passing off. The marketplace operates through
the lifeblood of sales volume and mass circulation. The Acad-
emy operates on a different currency, namely proper attribu-
tion. Scholarly articles are not composed in order to generate
author royalties and thereby amortize costs over the projected
life of the copyright with an allowance for the necessary profits
in order to warrant the initial investment in publishing them.
Rather, the entire incentive for their creation is (from the ce-
lestial perspective) to advance the frontiers of human
knowledge and (from the earthly vantage) to win their authors
recognition. The right of attribution here is not an after-
thought that threatens to skew the basic incentives; in the ac-
ademic context, it IS the incentive (or a large part of it), which
therefore must enjoy protection for the enterprise to continue
sensibly. "Citing is paying" in this environment. Here, dero-
gation of moral rights, which elsewhere mean something other
than morality, attests to a defect in moral character.108
Both Mallon and Nimmer argue that plagiarism norms are justi-
fied under the economic theory because the attribution right pro-
vides an incentive that encourages marginal authors to invest in
the production of works of authorship, and suggest that copyright
incentives are inadequate. Of course, that is an empirical hypothe-
sis based entirely on speculation. Moreover, even if one assumes
that the attribution right is necessary in order to solve market fail-
ures in works of authorship, there is no reason to think that the de
facto attribution right created by copyright is not entirely adequate.
107. 1VIALLON, supra note 95, at 237-38.
108. Nimmer, supra note 74, at 74-76.
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While copyright creates only very limited and contingent explicit
attribution rights, in practice it enables authors to exert an attrib-
ution right over the original elements of their works of authorship,
by enabling them to refuse permission to use those elements with-
out attribution. Copyright implicitly assumes that authors are ra-
tional economic actors, and that attribution has an economic value.
Indeed, the "work-made-for-hire" doctrine explicitly provides that
authors can contract away their rights, including the implied right
to claim attribution. Moreover, the de facto attribution right cre-
ated by copyright lasts for the entire copyright term, typically the
life of the author and for 70 years after the author's death.109
It follows that the attribution right created by plagiarism norms
is only necessary to prevent unattributed uses of the uncopyrighta-
ble elements of a work, such as short phrases, facts, and ideas. But
copyright explicitly deems protection of those elements unnecessary
and unjustified.
Moreover, in Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation,11 0 the Supreme Court unanimously and explicitly held
that trademark law cannot prevent "reverse passing off' of a public
domain work-a euphemism for unattributed copying or "plagia-
rism"-because the Copyright Act does not require attribution of
public domain works.11 1 The Court held that "reading § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act as creating a cause of action for, in effect, plagiarism-
the use of otherwise unprotected works and inventions without at-
tribution-would be hard to reconcile with our previous deci-
sions."112 In other words, plagiarism is not a crime, at least if the
plagiarized elements are in the public domain and not protected by
copyright.
Colloquial theories of plagiarism implicitly claim that plagiarism
norms are justified under the economic theory because authors
would choose not to produce works of authorship if they could not
insist on the attribution of facts and ideas, as well as original ex-
pressions. But this proposition is both implausible and never mean-
ingfully defended. Indeed, most non-academic authors correctly as-
sume that facts and ideas are free to use, and yet the discovery of
facts and generation of ideas continues apace. Presumably, authors
would relish attribution rights in facts and ideas, but colloquial the-
ories of plagiarism provide no credible economic justification for cre-
ating such rights.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
110. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).




Of course, colloquial theories of plagiarism actually rely on deon-
tological justifications, primarily some version of the Hegelian or
Kantian personality theories. For example, Mallon observes:
No, it isn't murder. But like murder it intrigues us at a com-
fortable remove, when we're out of the line of fire and have been
excused from the jury. Think how often, after all, a writer's
books are called his or her children. To see the writer's words
kidnapped, to find them imprisoned, like changelings, on some-
one else's equally permanent page, is to become vicariously ab-
sorbed by violation.113
This congeries of metaphors illuminates only the extent to which
Mallon channels the popular understanding of works of authorship
as an author's progeny.114 Parents are proud of their children and
want to be associated with them. All the more so in the case of
metaphorical children-like works of authorship, which are so much
more malleable and tractable. Likewise, Nimmer immediately fol-
lows his nominal economic justification for academic plagiarism
with a moral justification, replete with intellectual property meta-
phors:
This distinction also explains why the academic tort of plagia-
rism arises independently of copyright subsistence. Whether a
scholar in 2004 dishonestly attaches his name to writings of
the distant past or of last week, the offense does not differ in
kind. In either event, he is polluting the cognitive well and
disgracing his professional obligations by claiming credit
where it is not due. Plagiarism goes to the heart of the aca-
demic enterprise in a way that reverse passing off cannot affect
the commercial marketplace. For that reason, plagiarism is
and should remain a serious dereliction pursuant to the "House
Rules" that govern in the university setting.1 15
Colloquial theories of copyright typically assume that the attrib-
ution right created by plagiarism norms is justified because a work
of authorship is an expression of the personality of its author, and
authors have a right to claim ownership of expressions of their per-
sonality. This personality-based right does not extend only to the
113. 1VIALLON, supra note 95, at xiii-xiv.
114. See, e.g., Brian L. Frye, Scenes from the Copyright Office, 32 TOURO L. REV. (forth-
coming 2016).
115. Nimmer, supra note 74, at 76.
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elements of a work that are protected by copyright, but to any ele-
ment of a work valued by its author. Accordingly, if colloquial the-
ories of plagiarism present an accurate account of the rationale for
the development of plagiarism norms, they suggest hat plagiarism
norms express moral sentiments relating to the ownership of ideas,
rather than an effort to increase economic efficiency.
B. Fraud Theories of Plagiarism
Alternative theories of plagiarism hold that plagiarism norms are
justified because they prohibit a form of "academic fraud." For ex-
ample, St. Onge argues that academic plagiarism norms are vague
and overbroad, and offers a narrower definition of culpable plagia-
rism:
Plagiarism is an intentional verbal fraud committed by the
psychologically competent that consists of copying significant
and substantial uncredited written materials for unearned ad-
vantages with no significant enhancement of the materials cop-
ied.116
If "fraud" means "illicit gains by illicit methods," then we must
distinguish between "plagiarism pure," which reflects an intention
to commit fraud, and "plagiarism impure, mitigated, extenuated,
marginal, hapless, ignorant, careless, etc."117 The culpable plagia-
rist intends to deceive in order to obtain an improper benefit; the
innocent plagiarist does not.
Notably, St. Onge's fraud theory of plagiarism seems to exclude
many forms of unattributed copying prohibited by academic plagia-
rism norms. On its face, it appears to permit unattributed copying
of ideas, which are not "written materials," but abstractions. And
it arguably permits unattributed copying of facts.
But if plagiarism is defined as "copying significant and substan-
tial uncredited written materials," plagiarism becomes almost in-
distinguishable from copyright infringement.1 1 8 Further, this fraud
theory of plagiarism even seems to include a "fair use" exception, by
requiring "unearned advantages with no significant enhancement
of the materials copied."119 By implication, "copying significant and
substantial uncredited written materials" is not culpable plagia-
rism if the copier earns any advantage by significantly enhancing






the materials copied. This proposition seems like a rephrasing of
the copyright doctrine of transformative fair use, which permits
otherwise infringing uses that add value to the original.120 Indeed,
under this this fraud theory of plagiarism, the only difference be-
tween copyright infringement and plagiarism is that copyright ef-
fectively prohibits unattributed copying for the life of the artist plus
seventy years, and plagiarism norms prohibit unattributed copying
forever.
C. Economic Theories of Plagiarism
As discussed above, colloquial theories of plagiarism have occa-
sionally advanced cursory economic justifications for plagiarism
norms. But those putative economic justifications merely obscure
the fact that colloquial theories of plagiarism are really moral the-
ories, in a Hegelian or Kantian mold. While colloquial theories of
plagiarism may advance nominal economic justifications for plagia-
rism norms derived from copyright, their force depends on moral
arguments.
However, Judge Posner, rather unsurprisingly, advanced an ex-
plicitly economic theory of plagiarism in his amusing 2007 best
seller The Little Book of Plagiarism.12 1 Essentially, he argues that
academic plagiarism norms are justified because they prevent "ac-
ademic fraud" and encourage the production of original works of
authorship.
Posner begins by arguing that plagiarism is a form of concealed
copying and that plagiarism norms are justified because plagiarism
is a form of academic fraud that harms both consumers and produc-
ers:
Plagiarism is a species of intellectual fraud. It consists of un-
authorized copying that the copier claims (whether explicitly
or implicitly, and whether deliberately or carelessly) is original
with him and the claim causes the copier's audience to behave
otherwise than it would if it knew the truth. This change in
behavior, as when it takes the form of readers' buying the cop-
ier's book under the misapprehension that it is original, can
120. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105
(1990). But see, e.g., Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.
REV. 355 (2015) (arguing that the transformative fair use doctrine reflects embedded social
hierarchies); Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Transformative Fair Use, 3
BELMONT L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine
should apply to the transformative fair use analysis).
121. See generally POSNER, supra note 41.
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harm both the person who is copied and the competitors of the
copier.122
In other words, Posner argues that plagiarism defrauds consum-
ers by inducing detrimental reliance, and defrauds producers by en-
abling unfair competition. But are either of these claims correct?
Does plagiarism induce detrimental reliance, and if so, why is it
detrimental? Does plagiarism enable unfair competition, and if so,
why is it unfair? Or rather, is Posner correct that plagiarism is a
form of fraud?
VIII. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
Posner argues that academic plagiarism norms are justified be-
cause plagiarism defrauds consumers by inducing detrimental reli-
ance: "A judgment of plagiarism requires that the copying, besides
being deceitful in the sense of misleading the intended readers, in-
duce reliance by them."123 In other words, plagiarism defrauds con-
sumers by inducing them to rely on the representation that a work
is original and not plagiarized. One illustration of this theory pro-
vides that "[h]e buys a book that he wouldn't have bought had he
known it contained large swatches of another writer's book; he
would have bought that other writer's book instead."124
Nevertheless, Posner's argument that plagiarism defrauds con-
sumers by inducing detrimental reliance is entirely circular. Con-
sumers assume that an unattributed work is original and not copied
only because academic plagiarism norms prohibit unattributed cop-
ying. It is passing strange to argue that academic plagiarism norms
are justified because they induce consumer reliance. In the absence
of plagiarism norms inducing reliance, there is no reason to assume
that consumers would care about attribution. On the contrary, con-
sumers would presumably not expect attribution, and would not be
misled by a lack of attribution.
Indeed, when social groups adopt different plagiarism norms,
consumers make different assumptions. For example, in practice
journalistic plagiarism norms typically prohibit copying expres-
122. Id. at 106.
123. Id. at 19.
124. Id. at 20.
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sions without attribution, but permit copying ideas without attrib-
ution.125 As a consequence, consumers assume the unattributed ex-
pressions in a journalistic work originated with the author, but do
not assume the unattributed ideas originated with the author. In
other words, plagiarism is "detrimental" to consumers only because
and to the extent that plagiarism norms induce consumer reliance
in the first place.
Moreover, in the absence of academic plagiarism norms, plagia-
rism may benefit consumers. Copying expressions and ideas is
cheaper than creating new expressions and ideas. Accordingly, cop-
ying enables authors to produce new works of authorship more
cheaply, by investing their resources in the creation of new expres-
sions and ideas, rather than recasting existing expressions and
ideas.
In addition, the attribution of expressions and ideas does not nec-
essarily benefit consumers. In some cases, attribution provides val-
uable information, but in many cases it does not. Law reviews typ-
ically require the attribution of every non-original claim in an arti-
cle. 12 6 All too often, the claims in question are trivial, common
sense, or common knowledge in the field. 127 Attribution of such
claims burdens consumers by encouraging them to consult unhelp-
ful sources. One might just as well argue that academic plagiarism
norms are unjustified because they induce consumer reliance with-
out benefiting consumers.
IX. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Posner also argues that academic plagiarism norms are justified
because plagiarism defrauds producers by enabling unfair competi-
tion: "[C]ompetitive harm is a significant consequence of plagia-
rism. The plagiarist by plagiarizing improves his work relative to
that of his competitors and so increases his sales and fame relative
125. See, e.g., David Uberti, Journalism has a plagiarism problem. But it's not the one
you'd expect, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.cjr.org/watchdog/journal-
ismhas-a plagiarism pr.php.
126. Indeed, law review editors all too frequently expect authors to attribute original ideas
as well.
127. For example, Orin S. Kerr notes:
It is a common practice among law review editors to demand that authors support
every claim with a citation. These demands can cause major headaches for legal schol-
ars. Some claims are so obvious or obscure that they have not been made before. Other
claims are made up or false, making them more difficult to support using references to
the existing literature.
Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012).
162 Vol. 54
Plagiarism is Not a Crime
to theirs."12 8 In other words, plagiarism harms producers by ena-
bling plagiarists to unfairly compete with non-plagiarists. Further,
Posner explicitly analogizes plagiarism to trademark infringement:
"Trademark infringement in the market for ordinary goods corre-
sponds to plagiarism in the market for expressive goods."129
However, Posner's analogy fails because non-infringing plagia-
rism does not correspond to trademark infringement in any way.
Trademark law prevents consumer confusion regarding the origin
of a product by prohibiting the use of protected marks, but it does
not prevent competitors from producing similar products. Likewise,
copyright law effectively prevents consumer confusion about the
origin of a work of authorship by prohibiting competitors from cop-
ying certain original elements of a work of authorship in certain
circumstances, but it does not prevent competitors from producing
similar products.
Thus, plagiarism corresponds to trademark infringement only to
the extent that plagiarism norms prohibit illegitimate copying of
certain elements of a work. Conversely, plagiarism norms that pro-
hibit non-infringing plagiarism explicitly prohibit legitimate copy-
ing of facts and ideas, a kind of copying that is expressly permitted
by the Copyright Act and protected by the Constitution.130 Indeed,
Posner himself recognizes that academic plagiarism norms that
prohibit the "plagiarism of ideas" may harm the public interest by
reducing the dissemination of ideas.131
In other words, plagiarism norms that prohibit non-infringing
plagiarism prevent competition. But it is important to note that
these norms prohibit fair competition, not unfair competition. Cop-
yright law and the Constitution expressly exclude facts and ideas
from copyright protection because such protection is contrary to
public interest. Or, rather, copyright law expressly permits the cop-
ying of facts and ideas, with or without attribution, because it pro-
motes competition and the public interest.
128. POSNER, supra note 41, at 32.
129. Id. at 69.
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work."). See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 344-45 ("The most
fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts
he narrates."') (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 556).
131. POSNER, supra note 41, at 75-76.
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X. UNCONSCIOUS MORAL OBJECTIONS
Tellingly, even Posner's ostensibly economic justification of aca-
demic plagiarism norms frequently lapses into moral justifications.
To illustrate, Posner's primary example is the case of Kaavya
Viswanathan, a Harvard student who was accused of plagiarism
when it was discovered that many passages from her young adult
novel, How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life, closely
resembled passages from Megan McCafferty's popular young adult
novels, Sloppy Firsts and Second Helpings, among other books.132
In the wake of the ensuing scandal, Viswanathan's publisher re-
called her novel and cancelled her contract.
Posner condemns Viswanathan's plagiarism as the equivalent of
trademark infringement: "What Viswanathan did was no less-
though maybe no more-reprehensible than what a manufacturer
of toothpaste would be doing if he slapped the name of a better-
known brand on his toothpaste, even if his toothpaste was equal in
quality to that of the other brand."133 A person who intentionally
creates and sells counterfeit goods violates criminal trademark law
by intentionally misleading consumers about the source of the
goods. By contrast, Viswanathan did not violate any criminal law,
and her conduct probably did not even amount to copyright in-
fringement. Yes, she copied ideas and short phrases without attrib-
ution, but copyright law expressly permits that. If her actions were
"reprehensible," it is only because they violate academic plagiarism
norms, not because they were crimes or torts. But if her acts were
neither crimes nor torts, why are they "reprehensible"? Only be-
cause Posner believes that violating academic plagiarism norms is
a moral wrong.
Even more telling is Posner's claim that copying without attribu-
tion cannot be a fair use:
But the fair user is assumed to use quotation marks and credit
the source; he is not a plagiarist. I thus disagree that there can
be "fair use" when the copier is passing off the copied passage
as his own. The fair-use right is an exception to copyright,
which normally prohibits the unauthorized publication of cop-
132. Paras D. Bhayani & David Zhou, 'Opal' Similar to More Books, THE HARVARD
CRIMSON (May 2, 2006) http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/5/2/opal-similar-to-more-
books-kaavyal; David Zhou, Student's Novel Faces Plagiarism Controversy, THE HARVARD
CRIMSON (April 23, 2006) http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/4/23/students-novel-faces-
plagiarism-controversy-beditors/.
133. POSNER, supra note 41, at 95-96.
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yrighted work, and why should the exception shelter plagia-
rists? The plagiarist does not play fair. Were there such an
exception, one could write a book consisting entirely of
unacknowledged passages from other writers, provided one
only took a small amount from each work; in fact it would be a
case of both plagiarism and copyright infringement.1 3 4
This passage is remarkable because Posner's assertion is plainly
wrong. The Copyright Act protects the original elements of a work
of authorship, and the fair use doctrine permits the unauthorized
use of original elements of a copyrighted work under certain cir-
cumstances.1 3 5 But neither requires attribution. In fact, the Copy-
right Act only mentions attribution in relation to certain works of
visual art.1 36 In other words, attribution is irrelevant to fair use.
Posner objects to his hypothetical quote-novel not because it in-
fringes, but because it plagiarizes; or, rather, because the copying
novelist "does not play fair." This is not an economic objection, but
a moral one. An author who creates a new work of authorship com-
posed entirely out of quotes increases economic welfare by creating
a social benefit with no social harm. Any objection is necessarily
based on an attribution right that copyright does not provide.
Notably, Posner's "hypothetical" is not hypothetical at all. The
celebrated post-modernist Kenneth Goldsmith has created many
works by copying pre-existing works, in part or in whole, often with-
out explicit attribution.1 37 The Austrian-American author Walter
Abish's book 99: The New Meaning is a collection of stories that con-
sist entirely of unattributed quotations.138 And Jonathan Lethem's
brilliant essay The Ecstasy of Influence: A Plagiarism, consists
largely of unattributed quotations, albeit with an accompanying
key. 139
Significantly, while Posner defends the legitimacy of academic
plagiarism norms, he opposes their enforcement through the legal
system, favoring informal sanctions for an assortment of reasons.1 40
As he observes: "Plagiarism is thus the kind of wrongdoing best left
134. Id. at 16-17.
135. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-107.
136. Id. at § 106A.
137. See generally KENNETH GOLDSMITH, UNCREATIVE WRITING: MANAGING LANGUAGE IN
THE DIGITAL AGE (2011).
138. WALTER ABISH, 99: THE NEW MEANING (1990).
139. Jonathan Lethem, The Ecstasy ofInfluence: A Plagiarism, HARPER'S MAGAZINE (Feb.
2007), http://harpers.orglarchive/2007/02/the-ecstasy-of-influencel.
140. POSNER, supra note 41, at 33-37.
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to informal, private sanctions."1 4 1 One might wonder whether many
forms of so-called "plagiarism" are a kind of "wrongdoing" at all.
XI. THE JUSTIFICATION OF ACADEMIC PLAGIARISM NORMS
In light of these observations, I conclude that academic plagia-
rism norms prohibiting non-copyright infringing plagiarism are not
justified under the economic theory of copyright. Academic plagia-
rism norms prohibit unattributed copying of expressions, facts, and
ideas. To the extent that they prohibit non-copyright infringing
copying, they create an extra-legal attribution right in expressions,
facts, and ideas. In other words, academic plagiarism norms reflect
the desire of a particular social group to create an extra-legal at-
tribution right in expressions, facts, and ideas that the Supreme
Court has expressly held unconstitutional.1 42
A. Academic Plagiarism Norms Affecting Scholars
Defenders of academic plagiarism norms have offered many ex-
plicit and implicit theoretical justifications for the attribution right
they create. As explained above, the moral justifications for aca-
demic plagiarism norms are non-responsive to the economic theory
of copyright, and the putative economic justifications are not com-
pelling. To the extent that the attribution right created by aca-
demic plagiarism norms exceeds the constitutional scope of copy-
right protection, it is unlikely to provide a salient incentive to mar-
ginal authors. If the public feels "defrauded" by non-copyright in-
fringing plagiarism at all, it is only because academic plagiarism
norms exist in the first place. And non-copyright infringing plagia-
rism is "unfair" only because academic plagiarism norms say it is.
The only plausible economic justification for academic plagiarism
norms that prohibit non-copyright infringing plagiarism is that at-
tribution benefits the public by substantiating factual claims and
providing bibliographical references. Clearly, attribution often pro-
vides valuable information and thereby increases public welfare.
But not always. Sometimes, the attribution of expressions, facts, or
ideas is cumbersome and unhelpful. Attribution of clich6d phrases,
popular expressions, or formulaic statements is often unhelpful. As
the copyright merger doctrine recognizes, when an idea can only be
expressed in a limited number of ways, the expression of that idea
141. Id. at 38.
142. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 340.
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cannot and should not be protected by copyright.1 4 3 Attribution of
facts is often unhelpful, especially when they are attributed to sec-
ondary sources that neither meaningfully substantiate the facts in
question, nor provide any additional information. And attribution
of ideas is often unhelpful, especially when the original expression
of the idea was poorly executed or the idea itself has become com-
monplace.
Of course, it does not follow that the attribution of expressions,
facts, and ideas is wrong. On the contrary, authors should feel an
obligation to attribute any expressions, facts, and ideas they copy,
to the extent that doing so provides a public benefit. But, at least
on their face, academic plagiarism norms not only create a moral
obligation to attribute expressions, facts, and ideas when it provides
a public benefit, but also when it does not. Or, to put it another
way, academic plagiarism norms implicitly create an extra-legal
right to require the attribution of expressions, facts, and ideas,
which is effectively enforced by the academy irrespective of the orig-
inal author's wishes.
In other words, academic plagiarism norms do not just encourage
socially beneficial attribution, they require attribution irrespective
of its effect on social welfare. Often, the mandatory attribution of
expressions, facts, and ideas imposes costs that exceed any social
benefit. As observed above, while attribution is often helpful, some-
times it is unhelpful. When a mandatory but unhelpful attribution
causes a reader to obtain and review the unhelpful source, it im-
poses a social cost.
Mandatory attribution may also create inefficient incentives for
authors. Given the choice between investigating an idea that re-
quires an unhelpful attribution and an idea that requires no attrib-
ution, authors have an incentive to pursue the latter, even if the
former would provide a larger public benefit. To put it another way,
academic plagiarism norms create an incentive for scholars to
choose novelty over value. At least in theory, it is better to be the
first to express an idea than the first to express it well.
Moreover, even if the net social cost imposed by academic plagia-
rism norms is low, the individual cost is high. A scholar accused of
plagiarism incurs substantial personal and reputational costs, even
if the charge is not proven. And if a plagiarism charge is proven, a
scholar may be punished, or even pushed out of the academy, even
143. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
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if the plagiarism in question consists of as dubious a wrong as cop-
ying facts or ideas without attribution.
In addition, the social value generated by the mandatory attrib-
ution right created by academic plagiarism norms may have been
superseded by technology. Historically, the mandatory attribution
right ensured that scholars would provide references for all of their
non-original claims. But it did not create any guarantee that schol-
ars would provide the most helpful reference, or that references
would be helpful at all. Today, "digital humanities" databases can
automatically provide suggested references for any text, obviating
the need for burdensome and often unhelpful citations.144 Automat-
ically generated references should be preferable to the attribution
mandated by academic plagiarism norms, because they will priori-
tize impact over novelty. In other words, readers are directed to the
most useful source addressing an idea, rather than the first source
to address the idea.
The preceding observations suggest that academic plagiarism
norms are intended to solve the academy's internal coordination
problems, not in order to benefit the public. "People despise plagia-
rism not because it results in inferior works-by drawing from oth-
ers plagiarists may produce better works than they could by them-
selves-but because it is a form of cheating that allows the plagia-
rist an unearned benefit."145
Of course, one might believe that social groups ought to be enti-
tled to enforce internal social norms, so long as they do not violate
any legal prohibitions.1 46 As many scholars have shown, customary
property rules sometimes provide an efficient way of managing
scarcity and solving the tragedy of the commons.14 7 But there is no
prima facie reason to believe that customary property rules, devel-
oped to manage public goods, also correlate with efficiency. On the
contrary, they are often associated with cartelization and rent-seek-
ing.148
Scholars typically participate in an academic gift economy. Typ-
ically, they do not expect to receive direct compensation for the pro-
duction of scholarship, but, rather, receive indirect compensation in
144. I thank Jacob Rooksby for this observation.
145. Laurie Stearns, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 513, 518-19 (1992).
146. See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 18.
147. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1994).
148. See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Prop-
erty Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59.
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the form of promotion and prestige.149 But that does not mean that
we should respect plagiarism norms as in the public interest. Es-
sentially, academic plagiarism norms are a form of private ordering
intended to benefit insiders at the expense of outsiders. As Sayre
observed: "Academic politics is the most vicious and bitter form of
politics, because the stakes are so low."150 Likewise, plagiarism is
pursued and punished most vigorously in the academic world be-
cause the economic stakes are so low. The lower the economic value
of a work of authorship, the more important the right of attribution.
In sum, academic plagiarism norms are effectively a form of ex-
tra-legal rent-seeking. Academics want comprehensive protection
of the expressions, facts, and ideas they produce, which copyright
law does not and cannot provide. As a consequence, they rely on
extra-legal, quasi-property interests created by academic plagia-
rism norms. These interests are not justified under the economic
theory because they benefit academics, rather than the public. Ac-
cordingly, they should not be respected.
Notably, in practice, academic plagiarism norms are observed
largely in the breach. Studies of plagiarism routinely complain that
prominent scholars accused of plagiarism typically receive only a
slap on the wrist.15 1 When Stephen Ambrose, Doris Kearns Good-
win, Charles Ogletree, Laurence Tribe and others were accused of
plagiarism, they pleaded inadvertent error, and ultimately paid lit-
tle or no cost.1 52 They were publicly embarrassed, but did not lost
their jobs or careers. Notably, they were accused of copying partic-
ular expressions without attribution, not just ideas. Less promi-
nent scholars are typically less fortunate. They may be dismissed,
denied tenure, or even fired from tenured positions.
Moreover, it is an open secret in the academy that certain prom-
inent academics are notorious "idea-stealers." When they attend
conference and workshops, they collect interesting ideas expressed
by others and quickly write their own articles addressing those
ideas, without crediting the originator of the idea. Scholars typi-
cally react to these idea-stealers in much the same way as stand-up
comedians react to joke-stealers: they avoid expressing novel ideas
149. See, e.g., Brian L. Frye, The Gray Lady's Guide to Avant-Garde Cinema, 3 INCITE J.
EXPERIMENTAL MEDIA 54 (2011) (citing Tyler Cowen & Alexander Tabarrok, An Economic
Theory of Avant-Garde and Popular Art, or High and Low Culture, 67 So. ECON. J. 232
(2000)); DAVID J. CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY (1988).
150. Alan L. Otten, Politics and People, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1973, at 14.
151. See generally MALLON, supra note 95; see also POSNER, supra note 41, at 89.
152. See, e.g., Sara Rimer, When Plagiarism's Shadow Falls on Admired Scholars, N.Y.




in the presence of known idea-stealers and use informal social sanc-
tions like gossip to undermine the idea-stealers.15 3
However, prominent idea-stealers are rarely, if ever, formally ac-
cused of plagiarism. This suggests that the ostensible scope of aca-
demic plagiarism norms is exaggerated for effect, and that their ac-
tual scope is considerably narrower. While academic plagiarism
norms claim to prohibit the unattributed copying of ideas, in prac-
tice, it is difficult or impossible to make out a plagiarism claim for
copying an idea, especially if the alleged plagiarist is a prominent
scholar. Nor is it consistent with academic freedom to permit such
claims.154 Taken to the extreme, if academic plagiarism norms ac-
tually required the attribution of all previously expressed ideas, it
would encourage scholars to publish lists of half-baked ideas on the
Internet, in order to claim ownership of them, rather than engage
in actual scholarship. In practice, scholars do not feel obligated to
attribute unelaborated ideas, unless doing so is helpful to the
reader, which suggests that the scope of academic plagiarism norms
is narrower than claimed.
B. Academic Plagiarism Norms Affecting Students
While academic plagiarism norms that prohibit non-copyright in-
fringing plagiarism are largely toothless when applied to scholars,
they have profound consequences when applied to students. Stu-
dents accused of plagiarism may receive a failing grade, be sus-
pended from academic study, or even expelled. As Posner observes,
this probably reflects the comparative difficulty of identifying pla-
giarism in published versus unpublished works, although auto-
mated plagiarism-detection services make the task considerably
easier.155
However, even if one accepts the legitimacy of academic plagia-
rism norms as applied to scholars, it is not all clear that it makes
sense to extend them to students. Ultimately, the public purpose
and ostensible justification of academic plagiarism norms is to en-
sure that the public receives complete and accurate information
about the attribution of expressions, facts, and ideas. To the extent
that students are producing scholarship for public consumption, it
makes some sense that it should satisfy the same standards as work
produced by professional scholars.
153. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 18, at 1791. I am not aware of any scholars using the
more vigorous physical sanctions deployed by comedians, but would not be surprised if it has
happened.
154. See, e.g., Dutch, supra note 65.
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But the overwhelming majority of students are not producing
scholarship for public consumption. They are completing assign-
ments that will be read by a professor or teaching assistant and
then forgotten. It makes no sense to apply academic plagiarism
norms to such assignments, unless doing so will provide a pedagog-
ical benefit. And the evidence suggests the opposite.
As Rebecca Moore Howard has observed, academic plagiarism
norms prohibit certain forms of imitation that promote learning.15 6
In particular, many students most effectively learn how to write by
engaging in what Howard calls "patch writing," or "copying from a
source text and then deleting some words, altering grammatical
structures, or plugging in one synonym for another." 157 As Howard
observes, patch writing is a form of learning, not a form of cheating.
158 And to the extent that academic plagiarism norms prohibit and
punish patch writing by students, they impose substantial social
costs, by preventing students from engaging in pedagogically pro-
ductive activities.
It makes no sense to impose academic plagiarism norms on stu-
dents. The purpose is learning, not the production of scholarship.
The rules governing student work ought to be designed to prohibit
cheating, not "plagiarism." In other words, students should be pro-
hibited from engaging in practices that do not promote learning,
and encouraged to engage in practices that do promote learning.
When academic plagiarism norms are invoked to prohibit students
from engaging in pedagogically productive activities like patch writ-
ing, they are misused on their own terms. Moreover, they promote
a deep cynicism in students, who are keenly attuned to the coher-
ence and fairness of the rules that govern their actions. Unthink-
ingly applying academic plagiarism norms to students may even
have the unintended effect of causing them to discount the legiti-
macy of rules intended to prevent cheating, as well as irrelevant
rules intended to prevent plagiarism.
XII. CONCLUSION
Copyright infringement and plagiarism are related but distinct
concepts. Copyright prohibits certain uses of original works of au-
thorship without permission, and plagiarism norms prohibit copy-
ing certain expressions, facts, and ideas without attribution. The
prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which holds
156. See HOWARD, supra note 22.
157. Id. at xvii.
158. Id.
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that copyright is justified because it is economically efficient. Like-
wise, plagiarism norms are justified only if they are economically
efficient. It appears that academic plagiarism norms prohibiting
non-copyright infringing plagiarism are not efficient because they
decrease social welfare, especially in relation to students. Accord-
ingly, they are not justified.
